狡猾的迪克和美元

THE “Nixon shock” is not the name given to President Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974 amid the Watergate scandal, his bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam war or his audacious visit to communist China. It refers instead to a bundle of economic policies unveiled to an unsuspecting world on August 15th 1971. The president imposed a freeze on wages and prices for 90 days to break inflation, ended the convertibility of dollars into gold, and slapped a “surcharge” or tariff of 10% on imports.
“尼克松冲击”不是在说美国故总统尼克松在1974年为水门事件而下台，也不是在说他在越战期间对柬埔寨大肆轰炸，更不是在说他大胆的造访了共产中国。这词是在说他在1971年8月15日毫无预警的对世界宣布了一套经济政策。这位总统为了遏止通胀，将薪资成长和物价冻结了九十天，终结了美元和黄金可以用一定比例互换的制度(金汇兑本位制)，也对进口货物扣上了10%的”附加税”。

Nixon is not usually a source of inspiration for left-leaning pundits such as Paul Krugman of the New York Times. But like 130 congressmen, who this month signed a letter to Timothy Geithner, America’s treasury secretary, he is calling on the White House to emulate Nixon and impose a “surcharge” on imports from China. The tariff is supposed to force China to strengthen its currency, the yuan, against the dollar, just as Nixon’s surcharge prompted America’s trading partners to renegotiate their exchange rates four months later.
左倾的评论家如纽约时报的保罗˙克鲁曼，通常是不会把尼克松当作是惕励的对象。但是这个月，他连同一百三十位众议员签暑了一封信给美国的财政部长提摩西˙盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)，信中呼吁白宫要仿效尼克松对中国进口物品课征”附加税”。这个进口税的用意是要逼使中国让人民币对美元升值，正如当年尼克松的”附加税”逼使美国的贸易伙伴在四个月后重新议定汇率。

Mr Krugman argues that China’s weak yuan is costing America roughly 1.4m jobs. Its cheap currency gives its exporters an edge in the American marketplace. China then squirrels its dollar earnings away in American securities rather than spending them on American goods. In normal circumstances these asset purchases would lower interest rates, boosting American borrowing and spending. But America, like other rich countries, is now caught in a “liquidity trap”. Interest rates are as low as they can go. By saving dollars rather than spending them, China is draining demand from the world economy.
克鲁曼先生主张，中国被低估的人民币，让美国失去了将近一百四十万个工作。低估的汇率给了中国出口商在美国市场上的优势。然后中国像松鼠般把钱投资到美国证券上存起来，而不是用来买美国的商品。在正常情况下，对美国资产的投资会降低利率，因而提升美国人的借贷和消费。但是美国现在，和其他富有国家一样，也陷入了所谓的”流动性陷阱”。利率已经降无可降。中国将美元存起而不消费的行为，正消耗着世界的需求。

China’s foreign-exchange reserves now total $2.4 trillion, of which about 70% are thought to be in dollars. In 1971 the central banks of America’s trading partners had amassed a rather smaller hoard, of about $40 billion. But that was enough to buy the gold in Fort Knox three times over, if America upheld its commitment to sell the metal at $35 an ounce. Britain’s request to exchange dollars for gold on August 13th 1971 was the last straw. “Although the US government attached no great importance to the gold as such, a run on this gold would have been a sorry spectacle,” wrote George Shultz and Kenneth Dam, two prominent economic officials in the Nixon administration, in their book “Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines”. On August 15th Nixon, in effect, announced that America was now unwilling to do what it would soon be incapable of doing—converting dollars into gold at the agreed exchange rate.
中国的外汇存底现在总计达2.4万亿美元，其中大约70%是存成美元。在1971年时，美国贸易伙伴的央行累积的美元不多，大约只有四百亿美元。可是如果美国信守当时美元和黄金的兑换率，35美元兑一盎司黄金，这些美元已然足够可以买下三倍诺克斯堡(Fort Knox)库存的所有的黄金(译注: 美国储备的黄金大多存放在诺克斯堡)。英国在1971年8月13日要求将其持有美元兑换黄金是压倒骆驼的最后一根稻草。两位尼克松幕僚的重要经济官员，乔治˙舒尔茨(George Shultz)和肯尼˙丹(Kenneth Dam)，在他们的书”头条背后的经济政策(Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines)”中说，”虽然美国政府不认为黄金非常重要，但是如果发生黄金挤兑却也实在难看”。在8月15日，尼克松实际上宣布了美国政府不愿意履行其即将没有能力履行的事--将美元按既定的汇率兑换黄金。

Messrs Shultz and Dam argue that the import surcharge was intended as “an attention-getter and a bargaining chip”. It allowed John Connally, Nixon’s treasury secretary and a Texan, to stride down the corridors of international finance “with both guns blazing”. In the face of this bravado America’s trading partners duly backed down. By December they agreed to let the dollar fall (by a trade-weighted average of 6.5%) and the surcharge was removed. Nixon was able to present the humbling of the dollar as a political victory. But were Barack Obama to emulate him, would he really enjoy the same result?
舒尔茨先生和丹先生认为进口的附加税是刻意用来做为”注意唤醒剂和谈判筹码”。好让尼克松那位德州人的财政部长约翰˙康纳利(John Connally)，走在国际金融的大街上，”手持双枪亮晃”。在这样的威吓下，美国的贸易伙伴们全都乖乖就范。十二月不到，他们就同意让美元贬值(幅度约是交易额加权平均数的6.5%)，附加税也跟着取消。尼克松当时将美元的贬值宣传成政治上的胜利。不过如果奥巴马如法泡制，他会真的赢得同样的结果吗?

The obvious difference is that in 1971 America was locked into a system of fixed parities. By pegging to the dollar, a currency was automatically fixed to everything else. Since July 2008 China has pegged the yuan to the greenback. But over that period its currency has swung up and down against those of its trading partners and competitors. On a trade-weighted basis the yuan is back to where it was when the financial crisis started. Indeed, compared with China’s emerging-market competitors in its big export markets, the yuan is about 12% more expensive today than it was before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, according to a measure (the “third-country” effective exchange rate) calculated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. By this indicator China’s currency is about 25% above its level in 2005.
今昔最明显的差别是，在1971年时，美国和其他国家的货币是采用固定汇率制。任何一个货币，只要对美元挂钩，就会自动的与其他货币挂钩。自2008年7月以来，中国维持人民币与美元挂钩。但是，在同一段时间里，人民币与其贸易伙伴和竞争者的货币，在汇率上却有着上下的摆荡。以交易额加权平均数为基准来看，人民币的币值和金融危机开始时相差不多。根据香港主管货币机构编纂的一个指数(“第三国家”实际汇率)，中国比起其出口上竞争的新兴国家，确实在币值上比雷曼兄弟倒闭时升值了12%。这个指数也指出，中国的货币比2005年的水平要升值了25%。

The second difference is related to the first. Because everybody was pegged to the dollar in 1971, everybody had to pay the surcharge. Nixon dismayed everyone but discriminated against no one. China’s critics today, on the other hand, urge Mr Obama to slap a tariff on Chinese goods alone. This will reduce the demand for Chinese imports, which constitute about 15% of America’s total. But there is no guarantee that customers will switch from Chinese goods to American ones instead. They are more likely to buy from China’s rivals in Asia. The surcharge may change the composition of America’s trade deficit, without necessarily changing its size.
第二个差别和第一个有关。在1971年时，所有的货币都和美元挂钩，所以所有的国家都必须被课附加税。尼克松让所有的国家都沮丧，但却没对任何一个国家有差别待遇。今天批评中国的人，却催促奥巴马先生单独对中国商品扣上附加税。虽然这将减少对目前占美国总进口15%的中国进口品的需求。却不保证消费者会转而购买美国的产品。更可能的是，他们会对中国在亚洲的竞争者下单。附加税只会改变美国贸易赤字的组成比例，而不见得能改变其规模。

Nixon goes to China
尼克松造访中国

The Nixon shock holds lessons for China as well as Mr Obama. Like China today, Germany in the 1960s disavowed any responsibility for the world’s imbalances, insisting that the solution lay with tighter policies in deficit countries rather than looser policies in surplus countries. (Germany is still singing a version of that song.) But by holding fast to the dollar, Germany ended up importing America’s laxity. It could not insulate itself from the loose monetary policy engineered to help Nixon win the 1972 election. German prices rose by over 5% in 1971. China, too, risks a loss of macroeconomic control if it continues to peg to the dollar. Its money supply grew by about 35% in the year to February. That kind of surge may be a precursor to inflation.
尼克松的冲击，对中国以及奥巴马来说，都有借镜之处。正如今日的中国，1960年代的德国，也是拒绝承认对世界的贸易失衡有任何关系，并坚持解决之道在于贸易逆差国要紧缩，而不是贸易顺差国要放宽。可是经由对美元的挂钩，德国最终进口到美国货币上的宽松。尼克松为了赢得1972年选举，泡制了宽松的货币政策，而德国无法置身其外。德国物价在1971年上升了超过5%。如果人民币继续和美元挂钩，中国也同样冒着宏观经济失控的风险。该国货币供给在到二月份截止的年度里成长了35%。这种飙升也许是通胀的前兆。

The advocates of a surcharge argue that China will not act unless it is forced to do so. They point to defensive remarks by Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, arguing that the yuan was not undervalued and would remain “basically stable”. But the demise of the Bretton Woods system suggests that official statements can be a poor guide to future policy. The decision not to revalue is “final, unequivocal and for eternity”. That’s not a Chinese official in 2010, but a German official in the Nixon era—just five months before the Deutschmark was revalued by 9.3%.
附加税的鼓吹者主张，中国必须要有人施压才会行动。他们指出中国的总理温家宝仍做着防卫性的评论，说人民币并没被低估，也将会维持”基本上稳定”。但是布雷顿森林体系(Bretton Woods)的废弃，说明着官方说词通常不代表未来政策的走向。德国官方在尼克松时代说，我们决定不升值，而这决定是”不会改变、毫不含糊、直到永久”。这听起来像是中国官方的说法。在五个月后，德国马克升值了9.3%。

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维基有以下说明:
布雷顿森林协定（Bretton Woods Agreements）是第二次世界大战后以美元为中心的国际货币体系协定。布雷顿森林体系（Bretton Woods system）是该协定对各国就货币的兑换、国际收支的调节、国际储备资产的构成等问题共同作出的安排所确定的规则、采取的措施及相应的组织机构形式的总和。
美国作为储备货币发行国的责任
基本责任有两点：
1. 美联储保证美元按照官价兑换黄金，维持协定成员国对美元的信心
2. 提供足够的美元作为国际清偿手段