检察官、法官、陪审团三职合一

EUROPE’S trustbusters have plenty to boast about. Over several decades the European Commission’s competition directorate has evolved into perhaps the most important regulator of its kind in the world. It has been rigorous in the development of antitrust theory and an energetic enforcer of the law. While antitrust policy across the Atlantic has veered between the activism of the Clinton administration and the relative laissez-faire of the Bush years, it has shown consistency. More than any other body it has upheld the principles of the single market, often incurring the wrath of powerful member states. Yet despite its fine record, there are deep flaws in the way the directorate operates. The priority of the new competition commissioner, Joaquín Almunia, must be to address them.

欧洲的反托拉斯阵线大有夸耀之处。在过去的数十年中，欧盟委员会下设的竞争理事会凭借其对推动反托拉斯理念演变的一丝不苟以及强劲的执法力度，可以说已发展成为全球同类监管机构中最举足轻重的典范。尽管大西洋彼岸的反托拉斯政策已在克林顿政府的激进主义与布什政府相对的放任主义之间找到折中的道路，但理事会依然坚持其一贯性。没有另外一个机构比它更加维护单一市场原则，这经常招致欧盟几大强国的极度不满。尽管业绩良好，理事会在运作上仍然存在着严重问题。因此新任竞争事务专员杰奎英•阿尔穆尼亚的第一要务就是将其解决掉。

The problems are not new, but they have been given fresh salience by the fallout from the European Union’s case against Intel (see article). Last May the commission fined the chipmaker a record 1.06 billion euro($1.5 billion) under Article 82 (now 102) of the European treaty, which forbids dominant firms from abusing their power. The specific complaint against Intel, brought by its smaller rival, AMD, was that it had bribed PC-makers to buy its own processors.

这些问题其实并不陌生，但是英特尔案件掀起的风波使其获得全新的关注。去年五月，欧盟委员会参照《欧洲联盟条约》第82条（现为第102条）对芯片制造商英特尔公司处以10亿6千万欧元（15亿美元）的罚款纪录，其所涉条款正是为禁止垄断企业滥用实力而设。规模较小的行业竞争者闪龙公司针对英特尔公司进行了投诉，据称，后者贿赂个人电脑制造商购买其处理器。

The sheer size of the fine had an element of grandstanding about it. But a much bigger worry was that the commission’s trustbusters may have ignored evidence that could have weakened their case and made Intel’s conduct look less sinister. The EU’s ombudsman found that in the course of the commission’s investigation, it had failed to keep a record of a meeting with a senior executive from Dell, one of Intel’s biggest customers. Critics, whose concerns have increased with the ferocity of the sanctions imposed, say that by acting simultaneously as investigator, prosecutor, jury and sentencing judge, the commission is denying defendant firms the basic right to be heard by an impartial tribunal. They are right.

这笔十足的罚款数额不免哗众取宠的成分。但更令人担心的是，欧盟委员会的反托拉斯官员可能忽视了一些能够在一定程度上削弱其诉讼理由并减轻英特尔公司罪行的证据。欧盟的巡视官发现，在其调查过程中，委员会与戴尔公司一高管的谈话没有记录下来，而戴尔公司正是英特尔公司最大的客户之一。批评家们的担忧随所施制裁的严酷程度与日俱增，他们表示，通过同时扮演调查者、检察官、陪审团以及审判法官的角色，委员会实则剥夺了被告公司诉诸于公正法庭的基本权利。他们说得在理。

The rules under which the competition directorate operates, which date back nearly half a century, are grossly inadequate for the hugely enhanced role it plays today. There are three main objections. The first is the conflicted role of the case teams. These are appointed when the competition directorate decides to investigate a complaint about abusive behaviour from a business rival, an accusation of collusion or a merger with potentially anti-competitive consequences. The case teams investigate, propose a verdict and argue for a particular penalty. From the outset, the process is polluted by a prosecutorial bias. The second objection is that the accused company is denied a fair hearing. Although it gets the chance to put forward its side of the argument, it does so only to the case team, not to a neutral judge or hearing officer. As things stand, the role of the hearing officer is purely procedural. The third objection is that the final decision on culpability is taken on a vote by 27 politically appointed commissioners, only one of whom may have attended the defendant’s hearing.

竞争理事会的运作所依托的规则已有将近半个世纪的历史，对于支撑理事会如今大幅度提升的作用只能是捉襟见肘。这其中主要存在着三项异议。其一在于专案组的冲突性角色。当竞争委员会决定调查对一商业竞争者不正当行为的投诉、对相互勾结行为的控告或者具有潜在的反竞争性后果的合并时，它会指派专案组进行调查、发表裁定意见并对某一特定处罚进行论证。于是从一开始，这一诉讼就带有检控偏见。其二在于被控公司得不到公平的听审机会。尽管被允许做出我方申辩，但被告面对的只有专案组，而并非中立的法官或者听证官员。久而久之，听证官一职变得纯粹地程序化。其三在于最终问责取决于27名由政界委任的专员，而其中仅有一人可能参与到被告的听审之中。

A fair hearing, please
请给予公正的申辩之机

In no other area of law would it be thought acceptable for the outcome of such important cases to be determined by a bunch of politicians. In America the antitrust division of the Department of Justice has to make its arguments in open court, while even the quasi-judicial commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission appoint a judge to preside over hearings and publish findings. The process is long-winded and expensive but it is an intrinsically fairer way to establish the facts.

没有其它任何一个司法领域能够接受如此重要的案件结果由一帮政客来操纵。在美国，司法部下设的反托拉斯部门必须在公开庭审中展开论述，就连联邦贸易委员会的准司法专员也需要指派一名法官来主持听审并公布裁决。这一过程在时间与金钱上付出的代价更大，但它不失为一种更加公平的方式来弄清事件的原委。

Even if Mr Almunia procrastinates, change is coming. Europe’s Charter of Fundamental Rights will finally be ratified next year. It is highly probable that antitrust appeals to the European Court of Human Rights (based on the unfairness of a process that levies huge fines but falls far short of the standards expected of the criminal law) will succeed. Realistically, amending the treaty to remove the commission’s role as the enforcer of competition law is a non-starter. A more modest change would, however, improve things greatly and bring European practice closer to America’s without importing all its excesses. That is to give the hearing officer the power to make a factual and legal determination based on a proper examination of the evidence; the 27 commissioners would then have to accept or reject this. The system would still be far from perfect, but it would be a good deal more just.

即使阿尔穆尼亚因循坐误，变革终将到来。明年，《欧盟基本权利宪章》将正式生效。这样一来，向欧洲人权法庭提起反托拉斯上诉的制度（基于徵收巨额罚款并远不及刑法尺度的诉讼所体现出的不公平性）极有可能建立起来。现实地讲，通过修改条约来解除欧盟委员会作为竞争法执法者的权力是行不通的。恰恰是较为温和的变革才能较大程度地改善现状，将欧洲的执法实践与美国接轨并摒弃其一切过度行为。也就是说，要给予听证官足够的权力，以基于对证据恰当的审度就事实问题与法律问题做出裁定；之后，27名专员必须对此进行明确的表决。即使如此，这一司法体系仍将劣迹斑斑，但它无疑会变得更加公正。